"Seemingly unrecorded – a spectacular large format photographic map of Kiev, made on the eve of the WWII Battle of Kiev (August-September 1941), whereby the Nazis captured the city after an epic month-long contest against the Red Army; created from aerial photographs taken by reconnaissance officers aboard Luftwaffe planes, which were then edited and photographically printed at the local Wehrmacht headquarters, near Kiev, by a German Army ‘Motorized Surveying & Map Detachment’, bearing signs of field use - an amazing artefact from one the seminal events along the Eastern Front. Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 in what was known as Operation Barbarossa, a ‘Blitzkrieg’ (Lightening Warfare) campaign that sought to conquer all of the country west of the ‘A-A Line’ (the imagined meridian running from Archangel down to Astrakhan). The Germans were highly confident as the same techniques of rapid, mechanized warfare had practically mowed down France the year before. However, the Wehrmacht severely underestimated the extraordinary bravery and self-sacrifice of the Red Army troops and the severity of the Russian climate. The campaign resulted in several titanic battles involving hundreds of thousands of troops on each side, and while the Germans usually prevailed, they did so always at great cost, with each showdown delaying their progress eastwards and depleting their strength. Meanwhile, the Soviets seemed to be able to transcend unimaginable loss and suffering without losing their resolve; the Nazis eventually learned the hard way that they could not do the same. The Battle of Kiev (August 23 - September 26, 1941), often called the First Battle of Kiev, so as not to confuse it with another showdown in 1943, was one the great events of Operation Barbarossa. During the vicious month-long contest, the Wehrmacht encircled the Soviet Union’s third most important city, capturing or destroying the entire Soviet Southwestern Front Army. The battle has the distinction of being the largest encirclement (in terms of number of troops involved) in military history. To give an idea of the scope of the battle, the Germans dedicated 544,00 troops, consisting of 9 armoured divisions (with a heavy emphasis on tanks) and 25 infantry divisions, to the contest, while the city was defended by an elaborate series of fortifications and a Red Army force that initially numbered of 627,000 men. The Luftwaffe and the Germans’ heavy artillery systematically pounded the strategic infrastructure and military locations within the city in an effort to soften up resistance, but this did not bear fruit, as the Soviets bravely resisted, rushing in more troops to replenish their strength. However, the Wehrmacht pressed hard and managed to completely encircle Kiev while raising the tempo of their bombardment. The Soviets’ situation was hopeless, and at the end of the battle the Germans captured 452,700 Red Army troops, and 2,642 Soviet artillery pieces, along with 64 tanks. Beyond that, horrifically, the Red Army suffered around 700,000 casualties! The Battle of Kiev was a shocking defeat for the Soviets, and while certainly a great technical victory for the Germans, its place in the greater war remains debatable. While the Germans suffered 61,000 casualties and did not lose too much equipment, the month-long battle slowed the Wehrmacht’s progress towards the Volga River. In fact, when the battle concluded, at the end of September, winter on the Steppes was nigh. It would be argued that the Soviet’s tremendous sacrifice at Kiev did much to ensure that by the end of the 1941 campaign season, while Germany had conquered much of Ukraine and a good part of European Russia, it fell well short of its goals, failing to take Moscow or reach the Caucuses. During the 1942 campaign season, the Nazis pursued Case Blue, a high-risk/high-reward strategy that aimed to seize the Baku Oil Fields, but as we all know today, this would end in their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23 – February 2, 1943), which hailed the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. The present work is a large format ‘Bildskizze’ (translated as ‘picture sketch’). It was made in August 1941, immediately before the Wehrmacht attacked Kiev. As will be explored in more detail below, the map was made from photos taken by German military reconnaissance officers aboard high-altitude Luftwaffe flights over Kiev. The raw photos were then edited and prepared onto the present work by a German Army ‘Motorized Surveying & Map Detachment’ working at the local army headquarters outside of Kiev, where the present map was photographically printed. The map is the most accurate and up to date cartographic view of Kiev would have been directly consulted by the German High Command when preparing their attack, while also serving as a critical source for improving conventional military maps. The photographic map showcases the entire city of Kiev (the city proper had a population of 930,000 in 1940) and its environs. As shown, the city lies on the western bank of the mighty Dnieper River, surrounded on all sides by farmland. The street pattern of the old city, with its dense, irregular blocks and bastions, is clearly visible, and it sharply contrasts with that of the more modern midtown, which follows a rational grid-pattern of wider thoroughfares; while the low-density suburbs fan out into the countryside. All major topographical features and works of infrastructure are clearly visible, and the utility of the map is aided by the overlay of the white grid for rendering coordinates. On the map, the names of various key features and military targets have been drawn in in white lettering, including the ‘Dnjeper’ (Dnieper River, with an arrow showing its course); ‘Umgehungsbahn’ (bypass road); ‘Eisenbahnbrücke’ (railway bridge); ‘Hafen’ (harbour on the Dnieper); ‘Zitadelle’ (Citadelle / old fort complex); ‘Hauptbahnhof’ (railway station); ‘Güterbahnhof’ (rail freight depot); ‘Flughafen’ (airport); as well as marking the roads or railways leading out of the city towards various locations, including Odessa, Zhitomir, Vasylkiv and Borvary. Also, many other potential targets are clearly identified, including fortifications, factories, warehouses, military marshalling yards, as well as places such as sports stadiums. Of great importance, unlike all the other maps that the Germans had access to, the Bildskizze shows the scene in real time, noting many recent changes the Soviets may have made to the landscape or military or civilian infrastructure. For examples, the map reveals all sorts of recent and intense activity around the airport, as well as signs of heavy construction (defensive works) across the Dnieper from the city. A trained eye would surely be able to tease out dozens of more interesting details. To the point, the present map provided a wealth of information to the Wehrmacht High Command, as they planned their next moves, that would not have been available on any other map. Upon the outset of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht went to great lengths to acquire the most recent Soviet maps of potential battle zones, in many cases reprinting them at the German Army General Staff’s ultra-modern press in Berlin. While the Soviet maps tended to be of very high quality, they intentionally omitted much military information, such as the locations of most defensive works, while the Red Army had made so many changes to the landscape and military infrastructure all across the country that even the best printed maps in the possession of the Germans left much to be desired. The Wehrmacht needed much more detailed and up-to-date information for operational planning. In some instances, they gained this intelligence from human assets, but in other cases they had to go out and acquire it for themselves. Throughout World War II, the Wehrmacht operated numerous Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Motorisiert), which roughly translates to ‘Motorized Surveying and Map Detachments’. These highly sophisticated units were manned by skilled surveyors, draftsmen and printing technicians, and often (but not always) traveled in specially-fitted train cars that contained drafting/photography studios and advanced printing presses, while in other cases the equipment was transported to fixed locations in Nazi-controlled territories where a temporary publishing house was established. The places where the Detachments operated printing presses were called ‘Armee-Kartenstelle’ (Army Map Sites). The Motorized Map Detachments were usually assigned to and followed the progress of specific army corps and their workshops could be instantly set up close to battle fronts, where new maps could be made, or existing maps updated, predicated upon fresh aerial reconnaissance and field intelligence. In many cases, new maps could be generated within hours of fresh information arriving at the Armee-Kartenstelle. Of particular relevance to the present work, the Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Motorisiert) often sent skill mapping photographers up on high-altitude Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights to take photographs that could be edited into ‘bildskizze’ at the Armee-Kartenstelle, photographically printed, and then given immediately to field commanders. The bildskizze would otherwise be used by draftsmen to improve conventional printed maps. The exact circumstances of the production of the present work is described by the text written in the box on the lower right corner reads: ‘Angerfertigt nach Luftbildern der von Koluft 6 aufgenommenen Filme Nr. 10R, 54, 55, 57, 292, 299, 346 und 402 durch die K. Batterie (Bildzug) der Verm. u. Ka. Abteilung (mot.) 608 im August 1941. Das schwarze Gitternetz entspricht dem Gauss-Krüger-Netz der Karte 1:50000. Das wieße Gitternetz diente lediglich zur Erzielung einer einheitlichen Entzerrungsgrundlage. Beim Abgreifen von Punktkoordinaten kann mit einer mittleren Genauigkeit von 50m gerechner werden.‘ Translation: ‘Made from aerial photos of the films Nos. 10R, 54, 55, 57, 292, 299, 346 and 402 taken by Koluft 6 by the K. Battery (photo train) of Motorized Surveying and Mapping Detachment 608 in August 1941. The black grid corresponds to the Gauss-Krüger grid of the map 1: 50000. The white grid network only served to achieve a uniform basis for equalization. When picking up point coordinates, calculations can be carried out with an average accuracy of 50 metres’. This explanation reveals that in August 1941 the Koluft 6 (reconnaissance unit no. 6), working as part of the Motorized Surveying and Mapping Detachment 608, took photographs of the Kiev, certainly aboard high-altitude Luftwaffe flights. These raw photos would then have been developed at a special studio at the ‘Armee-Kartenstelle’, located near the Kiev at the Headquarters of the local German High Command. They would then have been adjusted for clarity, contract and sizing to create the template of the present bildskizze. Printed paper labels (containing the title and the caption) would then had been laid down, along with the aforementioned grid, while certain names on the map would have been added in manuscript in white. The resulting proof would then have been reproduced by photographic methods in only a very small number of examples. The first few examples of the bildskizze would have been rushed out to the high command to be used in battle planning sessions. A few other examples would remain for the map drafting corps, as the valuable up-to-date information could be integrated into new conventional printed maps, while a couple other examples would be sent to Berlin for the same purpose. It seems that the present example of the bildskizze was used for military planning in the field. A manuscript inscription the verso reads: “am 12/9/41 am FR278 Abgebeben” (“Turned in to FR278 (supposedly some army unit code?) on September 9, 1941”), a date which fell near the middle of the Battle of Kiev. Moreover, its rough condition suggests extensive field use. The present work seems to be unrecorded. We cannot trace a reference, let alone the location of another example. However, it is possible that another example or two survives in a German archive or library, with the understanding that many of Germany’s World War II collections are not yet well catalogued. This is not really surprising, as only a handful of the Bildskizze would have been made in the first place, and while they would have been highly valued by commanders during the Battle of Kiev, these large fragile works would tend to have perished during the action, or discarded shortly afterwards. It is worth noting that we were able to find a reference to a Bildplanskizze der Stadt Kiew 1:15000, likewise made in August 1941 by the Koluft 6, Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Mot.) 608. It is cited as one of the ‘Grundlagen’ (Sources) of a printed map, Stadtplan Kiew / Sonderausgabe A / 1:25.000 (1943), made around the time of the Second Battle of Kiev (1943), during which the Soviets liberated the city from the Nazis. While this bildskizze is clearly related the present work, it is noted as being of a different scale and we simply do not know what it looked like, as we cannot locate any surviving examples of that work. Further research may shed some light on the matter. Also, the press of the German General Staff in Berlin printed copies of the some of the bildskizze of various Soviet locations. They were often issued within rare portfolios of maps of the Eastern Front intended for the use of officers. However, these works were published in an entirely different technique than the original bildskizze made in the field, and are very different things, begin mere copies, not artifacts from the battle front. We are not aware of the current whereabouts of a Berlin copy of a Kiev bildskizze of any kind. " (Alexander Johnson, 2021)
pub_note
"Seemingly unrecorded – a spectacular large format photographic map of Kiev, made on the eve of the WWII Battle of Kiev (August-September 1941), whereby the Nazis captured the city after an epic month-long contest against the Red Army; created from aerial photographs taken by reconnaissance officers aboard Luftwaffe planes, which were then edited and photographically printed at the local Wehrmacht headquarters, near Kiev, by a German Army ‘Motorized Surveying & Map Detachment’, bearing signs of field use - an amazing artefact from one the seminal events along the Eastern Front. Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 in what was known as Operation Barbarossa, a ‘Blitzkrieg’ (Lightening Warfare) campaign that sought to conquer all of the country west of the ‘A-A Line’ (the imagined meridian running from Archangel down to Astrakhan). The Germans were highly confident as the same techniques of rapid, mechanized warfare had practically mowed down France the year before. However, the Wehrmacht severely underestimated the extraordinary bravery and self-sacrifice of the Red Army troops and the severity of the Russian climate. The campaign resulted in several titanic battles involving hundreds of thousands of troops on each side, and while the Germans usually prevailed, they did so always at great cost, with each showdown delaying their progress eastwards and depleting their strength. Meanwhile, the Soviets seemed to be able to transcend unimaginable loss and suffering without losing their resolve; the Nazis eventually learned the hard way that they could not do the same. The Battle of Kiev (August 23 - September 26, 1941), often called the First Battle of Kiev, so as not to confuse it with another showdown in 1943, was one the great events of Operation Barbarossa. During the vicious month-long contest, the Wehrmacht encircled the Soviet Union’s third most important city, capturing or destroying the entire Soviet Southwestern Front Army. The battle has the distinction of being the largest encirclement (in terms of number of troops involved) in military history. To give an idea of the scope of the battle, the Germans dedicated 544,00 troops, consisting of 9 armoured divisions (with a heavy emphasis on tanks) and 25 infantry divisions, to the contest, while the city was defended by an elaborate series of fortifications and a Red Army force that initially numbered of 627,000 men. The Luftwaffe and the Germans’ heavy artillery systematically pounded the strategic infrastructure and military locations within the city in an effort to soften up resistance, but this did not bear fruit, as the Soviets bravely resisted, rushing in more troops to replenish their strength. However, the Wehrmacht pressed hard and managed to completely encircle Kiev while raising the tempo of their bombardment. The Soviets’ situation was hopeless, and at the end of the battle the Germans captured 452,700 Red Army troops, and 2,642 Soviet artillery pieces, along with 64 tanks. Beyond that, horrifically, the Red Army suffered around 700,000 casualties! The Battle of Kiev was a shocking defeat for the Soviets, and while certainly a great technical victory for the Germans, its place in the greater war remains debatable. While the Germans suffered 61,000 casualties and did not lose too much equipment, the month-long battle slowed the Wehrmacht’s progress towards the Volga River. In fact, when the battle concluded, at the end of September, winter on the Steppes was nigh. It would be argued that the Soviet’s tremendous sacrifice at Kiev did much to ensure that by the end of the 1941 campaign season, while Germany had conquered much of Ukraine and a good part of European Russia, it fell well short of its goals, failing to take Moscow or reach the Caucuses. During the 1942 campaign season, the Nazis pursued Case Blue, a high-risk/high-reward strategy that aimed to seize the Baku Oil Fields, but as we all know today, this would end in their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad (August 23 – February 2, 1943), which hailed the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. The present work is a large format ‘Bildskizze’ (translated as ‘picture sketch’). It was made in August 1941, immediately before the Wehrmacht attacked Kiev. As will be explored in more detail below, the map was made from photos taken by German military reconnaissance officers aboard high-altitude Luftwaffe flights over Kiev. The raw photos were then edited and prepared onto the present work by a German Army ‘Motorized Surveying & Map Detachment’ working at the local army headquarters outside of Kiev, where the present map was photographically printed. The map is the most accurate and up to date cartographic view of Kiev would have been directly consulted by the German High Command when preparing their attack, while also serving as a critical source for improving conventional military maps. The photographic map showcases the entire city of Kiev (the city proper had a population of 930,000 in 1940) and its environs. As shown, the city lies on the western bank of the mighty Dnieper River, surrounded on all sides by farmland. The street pattern of the old city, with its dense, irregular blocks and bastions, is clearly visible, and it sharply contrasts with that of the more modern midtown, which follows a rational grid-pattern of wider thoroughfares; while the low-density suburbs fan out into the countryside. All major topographical features and works of infrastructure are clearly visible, and the utility of the map is aided by the overlay of the white grid for rendering coordinates. On the map, the names of various key features and military targets have been drawn in in white lettering, including the ‘Dnjeper’ (Dnieper River, with an arrow showing its course); ‘Umgehungsbahn’ (bypass road); ‘Eisenbahnbrücke’ (railway bridge); ‘Hafen’ (harbour on the Dnieper); ‘Zitadelle’ (Citadelle / old fort complex); ‘Hauptbahnhof’ (railway station); ‘Güterbahnhof’ (rail freight depot); ‘Flughafen’ (airport); as well as marking the roads or railways leading out of the city towards various locations, including Odessa, Zhitomir, Vasylkiv and Borvary. Also, many other potential targets are clearly identified, including fortifications, factories, warehouses, military marshalling yards, as well as places such as sports stadiums. Of great importance, unlike all the other maps that the Germans had access to, the Bildskizze shows the scene in real time, noting many recent changes the Soviets may have made to the landscape or military or civilian infrastructure. For examples, the map reveals all sorts of recent and intense activity around the airport, as well as signs of heavy construction (defensive works) across the Dnieper from the city. A trained eye would surely be able to tease out dozens of more interesting details. To the point, the present map provided a wealth of information to the Wehrmacht High Command, as they planned their next moves, that would not have been available on any other map. Upon the outset of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht went to great lengths to acquire the most recent Soviet maps of potential battle zones, in many cases reprinting them at the German Army General Staff’s ultra-modern press in Berlin. While the Soviet maps tended to be of very high quality, they intentionally omitted much military information, such as the locations of most defensive works, while the Red Army had made so many changes to the landscape and military infrastructure all across the country that even the best printed maps in the possession of the Germans left much to be desired. The Wehrmacht needed much more detailed and up-to-date information for operational planning. In some instances, they gained this intelligence from human assets, but in other cases they had to go out and acquire it for themselves. Throughout World War II, the Wehrmacht operated numerous Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Motorisiert), which roughly translates to ‘Motorized Surveying and Map Detachments’. These highly sophisticated units were manned by skilled surveyors, draftsmen and printing technicians, and often (but not always) traveled in specially-fitted train cars that contained drafting/photography studios and advanced printing presses, while in other cases the equipment was transported to fixed locations in Nazi-controlled territories where a temporary publishing house was established. The places where the Detachments operated printing presses were called ‘Armee-Kartenstelle’ (Army Map Sites). The Motorized Map Detachments were usually assigned to and followed the progress of specific army corps and their workshops could be instantly set up close to battle fronts, where new maps could be made, or existing maps updated, predicated upon fresh aerial reconnaissance and field intelligence. In many cases, new maps could be generated within hours of fresh information arriving at the Armee-Kartenstelle. Of particular relevance to the present work, the Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Motorisiert) often sent skill mapping photographers up on high-altitude Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights to take photographs that could be edited into ‘bildskizze’ at the Armee-Kartenstelle, photographically printed, and then given immediately to field commanders. The bildskizze would otherwise be used by draftsmen to improve conventional printed maps. The exact circumstances of the production of the present work is described by the text written in the box on the lower right corner reads: ‘Angerfertigt nach Luftbildern der von Koluft 6 aufgenommenen Filme Nr. 10R, 54, 55, 57, 292, 299, 346 und 402 durch die K. Batterie (Bildzug) der Verm. u. Ka. Abteilung (mot.) 608 im August 1941. Das schwarze Gitternetz entspricht dem Gauss-Krüger-Netz der Karte 1:50000. Das wieße Gitternetz diente lediglich zur Erzielung einer einheitlichen Entzerrungsgrundlage. Beim Abgreifen von Punktkoordinaten kann mit einer mittleren Genauigkeit von 50m gerechner werden.‘ Translation: ‘Made from aerial photos of the films Nos. 10R, 54, 55, 57, 292, 299, 346 and 402 taken by Koluft 6 by the K. Battery (photo train) of Motorized Surveying and Mapping Detachment 608 in August 1941. The black grid corresponds to the Gauss-Krüger grid of the map 1: 50000. The white grid network only served to achieve a uniform basis for equalization. When picking up point coordinates, calculations can be carried out with an average accuracy of 50 metres’. This explanation reveals that in August 1941 the Koluft 6 (reconnaissance unit no. 6), working as part of the Motorized Surveying and Mapping Detachment 608, took photographs of the Kiev, certainly aboard high-altitude Luftwaffe flights. These raw photos would then have been developed at a special studio at the ‘Armee-Kartenstelle’, located near the Kiev at the Headquarters of the local German High Command. They would then have been adjusted for clarity, contract and sizing to create the template of the present bildskizze. Printed paper labels (containing the title and the caption) would then had been laid down, along with the aforementioned grid, while certain names on the map would have been added in manuscript in white. The resulting proof would then have been reproduced by photographic methods in only a very small number of examples. The first few examples of the bildskizze would have been rushed out to the high command to be used in battle planning sessions. A few other examples would remain for the map drafting corps, as the valuable up-to-date information could be integrated into new conventional printed maps, while a couple other examples would be sent to Berlin for the same purpose. It seems that the present example of the bildskizze was used for military planning in the field. A manuscript inscription the verso reads: “am 12/9/41 am FR278 Abgebeben” (“Turned in to FR278 (supposedly some army unit code?) on September 9, 1941”), a date which fell near the middle of the Battle of Kiev. Moreover, its rough condition suggests extensive field use. The present work seems to be unrecorded. We cannot trace a reference, let alone the location of another example. However, it is possible that another example or two survives in a German archive or library, with the understanding that many of Germany’s World War II collections are not yet well catalogued. This is not really surprising, as only a handful of the Bildskizze would have been made in the first place, and while they would have been highly valued by commanders during the Battle of Kiev, these large fragile works would tend to have perished during the action, or discarded shortly afterwards. It is worth noting that we were able to find a reference to a Bildplanskizze der Stadt Kiew 1:15000, likewise made in August 1941 by the Koluft 6, Vermessungs- und Karten-Abteilung (Mot.) 608. It is cited as one of the ‘Grundlagen’ (Sources) of a printed map, Stadtplan Kiew / Sonderausgabe A / 1:25.000 (1943), made around the time of the Second Battle of Kiev (1943), during which the Soviets liberated the city from the Nazis. While this bildskizze is clearly related the present work, it is noted as being of a different scale and we simply do not know what it looked like, as we cannot locate any surviving examples of that work. Further research may shed some light on the matter. Also, the press of the German General Staff in Berlin printed copies of the some of the bildskizze of various Soviet locations. They were often issued within rare portfolios of maps of the Eastern Front intended for the use of officers. However, these works were published in an entirely different technique than the original bildskizze made in the field, and are very different things, begin mere copies, not artifacts from the battle front. We are not aware of the current whereabouts of a Berlin copy of a Kiev bildskizze of any kind. " (Alexander Johnson, 2021)
Pub Note
false